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- Reforming UN Peacekeeping
- United States Promotes Performance and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping
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It provides an overview of the parties to the conflict, its dynamics, and the fractures which hamper its resolution.
The study also provides recommendations that would help in the implementation of the agreement, such as using R-ARCSS institutions to build trust among leadership. Second, almost all inter-organizational relationships are beset by discussions over the division of labor, mandate priority, and the lead role. Third, is it sustainable for PKOs to be dependent on multiple players with differing levels of commitment? It offers an analysis of protection threats related to violent extremism, and the strategy developed to address them.
Five Reform Areas for Effective Peacekeeping Performance - World | ReliefWeb
It concludes that approaches are not directly replicable among missions, and recommends that MINUSMA explores the full spectrum of tools, ensures the independence of its POC activities from counterterrorism agendas, and articulates a political strategy that prioritizes POC. Challenging the Conventional: Making Post-Violence Reconciliation Succeed — Kofi Annan Foundation This report highlights relevant policies and best practices that can guide reconciliation in order to secure stability and democratic governance in countries emerging from violent conflict.
It draws on findings from four case studies conducted in Guatemala, South Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Northern Ireland to identify the key questions and issues practitioners and policy-makers need to focus on when designing and implementing reconciliation processes. It concludes with recommendations, including prioritizing women's participation in the different phases towards peace agreements.
Shared Security, Shared Elections: Best Practices for the Prevention of Electoral Violence - The American Friends Service Committee This study explores the most efficient electoral violence prevention practices by reviewing existing literature and the analysis of interviews with practitioners in four countries. It urges prevention programs to include long-term plans for at-risk youth who are likely to participate in violence, as well as follow-up assessment mechanisms to ensure the sustainability of peace and security.
Preventing Radicalization and Extremism Leading to Terrorism. Global Terrorism Index - Institute for Economics and Peace This report provides a summary of key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 20 years. It highlights the decrease in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks for the third consecutive year, although the impact of terrorism remains widespread. It states that the decline of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant ISIL in Iraq and Syria has moved the conflict to the Maghreb and Sahel regions, and expects the threat of returning foreign fighters to be reinforced as the group continues to lose ground.
More effective and efficient civilian components will not result from budget cuts—management reforms are needed. Moreover, the selection of senior mission leaders is not transparent and still prone to prioritizing geographical representation over competencies. In addition to lacking adequate experience, these senior leaders receive little pre-deployment training or mentoring in the field.
Tackling this recommendation will require significant changes in the bureaucracy of the UN, particularly the Department of Field Support and the Department of Management. Unfortunately, some member states are prioritizing financial interests part of the status quo—e.
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Member states need to show strong support for these management reforms as they are likely to face strident resistance from Secretariat entities and personnel who fear the reforms will result in a significant loss of their power and resources. Since , the UN has instigated four independent or special investigations: three into instances of failures to protect civilians, and one into an attack in the DRC that resulted in many peacekeeper casualties.
While these investigative mechanisms are an important tool for the UN to identify and address mission-specific and system-wide weaknesses, their application remains ad hoc, lacking adequate guidance on what triggers an investigation, the use of a consistent methodology, and how findings, recommendations, action plans, and follow-up monitoring are shared with member states and the public.
Recent pressure by Security Council members on the Secretariat to develop such guidance must be sustained if investigations are to result in immediate remedial action and address individual, mission, and system failures. The budget negotiations in the Fifth Committee demonstrate how member states can, and do, constrain efforts to improve peacekeeping performance. The A4P initiative gives member states the opportunity to build sustain high-level political support to match mandates with capabilities and ensure priority management reforms are implemented.
ReliefWeb has been the leading online source for reliable and timely humanitarian information on global crises and disasters since Learn more about ReliefWeb. Many of you more than , subscribers at the last count! These outcomes include whether specific peacekeeping tasks are associated with more cooperative responses from the local population Gizelis, ; Ruggeri et al. First, an important evolution of the political phenomena is under scrutiny. Or, to put it more technically, a shift in the dependent variable has occurred, from a focus on peace survival to the effects of peacekeeping on violence dynamics.
Clearly, this shift is neither complete nor necessarily desirable, but recent empirical studies, on average, exhibit this tendency. This shift has also occurred in consonance with an analytical move toward a comparatively disaggregated study of peacekeeping as the unit of analysis has switched from country-year or conflict spell to models featuring the higher temporal granularity of conflict dynamics usually monthly variation while endorsing more precise spatial variation within countries.
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This section briefly summarizes the main theoretical tenants of quantitative empirical study of peacekeeping effectiveness. Most of these theories e. Second, this section highlights the data and research designs that have been used to evaluate the effectiveness of peace operations. The theoretical arguments put forward to explain the effectiveness of a peace mission hinge on the idea that peacekeeping increases the cost of fighting.
Doyle and Sambanis propose a simple model in which peacebuilding outcomes are a function of three factors: a the level of hostility prevalent at the start of the peace process, b local capacities for reconstruction and development, and c international capacities for peacebuilding mostly thorough UN peace operations. First, peacekeeping deterrence helps prevent conflicts from spilling over into noncombatant areas, thus reducing and limiting violence.
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Third, information flows can be crucial, as government and rebel leaders often lack information about their relative strength. By providing such information, peacekeepers can assist the peace process.
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Further elaborating the informational argument, monitoring is a commonly proposed mechanism for effectiveness. Observing and monitoring, per se, are not sufficient conditions for deterring parties from using violence. Indeed, monitoring activities are more effective when troops are deployed instead of unarmed observers.
Signaling commitment and willingness to punish violations by deploying large military contingent is key for the success of peace missions. They argue that commitment relies on ensuring that parties do not subvert and violate agreements, while deterrence is used to avoid local actors to spoil peace when national principals loosely control them.
United States Promotes Performance and Accountability in UN Peacekeeping
As consequence, military presence is even more relevant for deterrence than for commitment, as the latter can ultimately be political at its core. Relatedly, when comparing mission cross-nationally, Fortna notices that Chapter VI and Chapter VII missions the latter with robust enforcement mandates do not have a distinguishable effect on halting conflict. She identifies the mechanisms through which peacekeeping reduces violence as political and economic, and are not, therefore, a function of military capability.
But such translations should be undertaken carefully when translating dynamics at the national level to political actors with local dynamics. Political and economic leverages or commitment may be insufficient for deterring local actors from engaging in violence, especially when elites lack control over their constituents. The mechanism of commitment works at the institutional or macro level and is independent of military capacity; for the role of military deployment, it is more salient for deterrence at the local level.
Peacekeepers can also play more active roles to signal commitment, instead of relying on passively monitoring compliance, including by enforcing peace agreements or ceasefires and by reassuring parties. Enforcement missions are not consent based, which implies that at least one party must be coerced not to use violence. Exerting this compelling effect requires a clear, visible, and credible threat to use force, more than deterrence does. Similarly, reassurance is usually associated with security guarantees offered by the United Nations, whose credibility is predicated on its military presence.
In other words, both enforcement and reassurance mechanisms rely on higher degrees of coercion than the others. While these theoretical mechanisms imply reasonable expectations on the effectiveness and impact of peace missions, their empirical testing presents several challenges. First, data collection on peacekeeping has lagged behind an increasing interest in disaggregating the analytical unit, in time and space. A second challenge is causal identification.
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Peacekeeping is not random, which creates problems when estimating the treatment effect. The evolution of empirical approaches has substantially increased our confidence in the evidence supporting peacekeeping effectiveness. Early empirical approaches used cross-sectional country-level data in which outcomes were compared without correcting for the influence of nonrandom assignment of peace operations to conflicts.
In the best case, peacekeeper presence was measured as a dummy, which hid many substantial differences across peace missions. Using a dummy to measure peacekeeping in host countries and comparing them to other civil wars without peacekeeping captures any significant heterogeneity among these groups but hides all variations across missions. Again, the problem of nonrandom assignment has usually been overlooked or has not been addressed.
Gilligan and Sergenti were the first to propose matching for pre-process data and to allow comparison between most similar cases. Matching allows researchers to balance the treatment and control group based on a set of observable factors to generate meaningful counterfactuals.
Once the sample is matched, observations are weighted so that the two groups are comparable. Thus, the difference in conflict-related violence between the matched treated factual civil wars with peacekeeping and the untreated counterfactual civil wars without peacekeeping is an estimate of the average effect of peacekeeping on violence. One problem with such an approach, however, is that nonobservable factors could determine whether civil wars receive peacekeepers.